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Abstract
I explore Leibnizian themes in the theoretical physicist’s pursuit of a
quantum cosmology by examining Smolin’s program based on the elim-
ination of ideal elements.1 These constructs are formal mathematical
structures of a physical theory that require for their interpretation the
existence of objects external to the system treated by the theory. After
introducing some necessary background information, I discuss the partic-
ulars of Smolin’s definition of ideal elements and analyze his motivations
and arguments for the elimination of ideal elements. I then survey and
assess his two specific proposals for the construction of a quantum cosmol-
ogy. The former stems from the canonical approach to the development
of a quantum theory of gravity; the latter consists of a series of hypothe-
ses framing a speculative fundamental theory of the universe. Finally,
I consider the explicit links and debts of Smolin’s program to Leibniz’s
philosophy.
1See [41].
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1 Quantum Gravity, Quantum Cosmology, and
All That
1.1 Leibnizian Themes at the Frontier of Physics
In the ongoing quest for a quantum theory of gravity, Gottfried Wilhelm Leib-
niz’s philosophy finds a modern revival. This circumstance may surprise the
stranger to such pursuits—21st century physicists attempting to unify general
relativity with quantum mechanics through 17th century thought—but the prac-
titioner perceives good reason to peer backwards. Today we most famously
remember Leibniz for his row with Sir Isaac Newton: the two brilliant men dis-
puted not only the attribution of credit for inventing calculus, but also the true
nature of motion. The latter disagreement, subsequently coined the absolute–
relative debate, draws Leibniz’s philosophy into contemporary physics. For,
this puzzle sits at the heart of conceptual and technical efforts to construct a
quantum theory of gravity.
The Leibnizian approach to classical and quantum gravity is most commonly
associated with the work of Julian Barbour.2 In the past thirty years he has
pioneered the application of Leibnizian and Machian ideas to the foundations
of physics. His research has helped to elucidate the Machian bases of both
classical mechanics and general relativity and to establish novel approaches to
understanding quantum gravity. Instead of exploring Leibnizian themes directly
through Barbour’s work, I have elected to examine the paper Space and Time in
the Quantum Universe by Lee Smolin, a former collaborator of Barbour. Smolin
confronts the problem of constructing a physical theory of a closed system from
contemporary physics. Drawing on the Leibnizian viewpoint, he develops a
strategy for attacking this problem based on his concept of ideal element. He
then presents two proposals outlining explicit solutions to the problem. After
presenting some introductory material in the following three subsections, in-
cluding an overview of Smolin’s article, I begin my analysis of this particular
Leibnizian approach in the second section.
1.2 Theoretical Physicist’s Wish List
A quantum theory of gravity and a quantum theory of the entire universe eas-
ily top my list of the most desirable goals of contemporary physics.3 After
these two potential accomplishments of human ingenuity and intellect, my rank-
ings becomes murkier. The following issues occupy the next five places in no
particularly definite order: a resolution to the measurement problem of quan-
tum theory, an explanation of the arrow of time, a grand unified theory of the
electromagnetic, weak nuclear, and strong nuclear forces, a prediction of the
universe’s particle content and natural constants, and a solution to the cosmo-
logical constant problem. All of these issues clearly do not exist in isolation;
they interconnect one with another, a hopeful indication of the unity of physics.
Allow me to return to the top two places on my list. These two pursuits
will concern us throughout my essay, so I should further introduce them now.
The quantum theory of gravity designates the hypothetical unification of gen-
2See [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10].
3The extent to which these two pursuits coincide remains undetermined.
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eral relativity with quantum mechanics. These latter two theories form the
basis of our most fundamental understanding of the physical world. Both the-
ories have withstood extensive experimental tests, yet they have never been
probed in regimes where the two theories’ respective effects appreciably inter-
act. Both theories claim universality of application, yet they differ markedly
and incompatibly in their modes of description. Physicists thus think that we
must reconcile the two theories in some appropriate unification. Besides the
two theories’ experimental successes, there are several reasons to believe that
we must retain aspects of both general relativity and quantum mechanics in
a more fundamental theory. Foremost of these is the fact that general rela-
tivity and quantum mechanics describe complementary aspects of the physical
world. General relativity represents our deepest understanding of space, time,
and gravitation; quantum mechanics represents our deepest understanding of
matter and its (nongravitational) interactions. General relativity employs an
effective, coarse-grained description of matter; quantum mechanics employs an
outmoded, simplified description of spacetime. Where the middle ground lies,
however, still remains a mystery.4
A quantum cosmology is a theory of a closed system that incorporates quan-
tum mechanics in some appropriate manner. Physicists tacitly assume that a
closed system refers to the universe because “the smallest closed system [that]
we observe appears to be astronomically large and is generally known as the
[u]niverse.”5 The theoretical pursuits of quantum gravity and of quantum cos-
mology are often linked. Some physicists contend that the former is tantamount
to the latter, and some physicists contend that the latter is tantamount to the
former. In any case, as general relativity forms the basis of our best descriptions
of both gravitation and cosmology, the attempt to bring quantum mechanics to
this theory appears to necessarily intertwine the two aforementioned pursuits.
Despite decades of determined effort, we have yet to develop satisfactory theories
of quantum gravity and of quantum cosmology. There exist a myriad of reasons
for this situation, conceptual and technical. In his article Smolin identifies a
particular cause and builds a novel approach to quantum cosmology upon it.
As Smolin argues and as most physicists in this field maintain, two recalcitrant
problems stand at the heart of quantum gravity.
1.3 Two Most Popular Physics Problems for Philosophers
1.3.1 The Absolute–Relative Debate
Our first problem—the absolute–relative debate over the nature of motion—
has a history surpassing three centuries: we typically trace its origins to the
dispute between Newton and Leibniz sparked by the publication of the former’s
theory of dynamics in the 1687 Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica.
Newton promoted the notions of absolute space and absolute time as the true
stage on which dynamics plays out. Leibniz countered, arguing that all motion is
relative: “space being an order of coexistence as time is an order of successions.”6
Although Leibniz might have possessed the epistemological upper hand, Newton
definitely had ontological superiority. For, as various physicists and philosophers
4See [15] for a good philosopher’s introduction to quantum gravity.
5[34], 2885.
6Quoted in [41] on page 228.
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have remarked, the absolute–relative debate is decided by dynamical theory.7
Newton had a powerfully predictive theory; Leibniz had an eminently attractive
philosophy.
Absolute space and time came under fire from various sources—most no-
tably, George Berkeley and Ernst Mach—through the remainder of the prerela-
tivistic period. As none of these critics could produce a relational dynamics to
challenge Newton’s, the latter theory remained ascendant. Mach did, however,
make a lasting contribution. He hypothesized that there might be an alternative,
dynamical explanation for the appearance of absolute acceleration in classical
mechanics: distant matter in the universe provides an effective frame of refer-
ence with respect to which acceleration actually occurs. He also hypothesized
that the phenomenon of inertia arises from the interaction of local with distant
matter. Although Mach fell short of constructing a theory embodying this idea,
he gave impetus to the relationalist8 program by elucidating a dynamical mech-
anism that had the potential to replace absolute space. Einstein, who coined
the phrase Mach’s principle for the above conjecture, cited its influence in the
development of general relativity. Barbour, who later distinguished two Mach’s
principles, employed these ideas to elucidate the relational underpinnings of
general relativity.
The development of special relativity theory revived the debate: with a new
dynamics physicists and philosophers could weigh the theory’s import for the
nature of motion. Despite its suggestive name, special relativity sided with the
absolutists. The theory’s inertial frames serve much the same function as did
Newton’s absolute space and time; moreover, Minkowski spacetime—though a
significant advance for physics—forms a fixed background.
With the advent of general relativity theory, the stage for the contempo-
rary absolute–relative debate was largely set. General relativity incorporates
several key features that complicate the dispute. Most importantly, the theory
uses a dynamical spacetime metric, which evolves in intimate symbiosis with
matter and energy according to the Einstein field equations. Thus, unlike in
Newtonian mechanics and special relativity, the spacetime of general relativity
is not fixed: it responds to and is partially determined by its matter and energy
content. Our ability to differentiate spacetime from matter-energy is blurred.
Secondarily, the spacetime metric is also isomorphic under arbitrary diffeomor-
phisms: we can recoordinatize spacetime in an infinite number of ways, all the
while maintaining the physical content encoded in the metric and matter fields.9
Needless to say, there remains controversy regarding general relativity’s import
for the absolute–relative debate.10 In the contemporary philosophical litera-
ture these two positions have morphed into substantivalism and relationalism,
7Barbour writes: “[A] distinction between [Newton’s] absolute concepts and Leibniz’s rela-
tional concepts becomes meaningful only at the level of dynamical theories of motion . . . The
argument therefore hinges on the ability of rival camps to formulate dynamical laws of motion”
([1], 251). Ian Hacking writes: “There can be no determination of spatial relations without a
study of the laws of nature attributed to objects in space” ([30], 250).
8I employ the adjective ‘relationalist’ rather than ‘relativist’ to avoid confusion with the
latter’s modern usage, denoting a physicist who studies relativity theory. As we shall see
momentarily, ‘relational’ has replaced ‘relative’ in the contemporary debate.
9This so-called diffeomorphism invariance is an integral part of Einstein’s famous hole
argument.
10Some philosophers even contend that the debate is no longer viable. Others disagree. See
[38] and [32], respectively.
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respectively. Essentially, the substantivalist affirms that space or spacetime
“exists independently of all material entities, consequently possessing certain
intrinsic characteristics.”11 The relationalist denies this claim, maintaining that
“spatiotemporal relations reduce completely to the relations amongst material
entities.”12
1982 marked a new high point for relationalism. That year Barbour and
Bruno Bertotti published a relational reduction of Newtonian mechanics and
elucidated the Machian basis of general relativity.13 Although this work has not
received the attention that it deserves, these results are reasonably well-known
to researchers in the quantum gravity community. As we shall see, Smolin draws
heavily on Barbour-Bertotti theory.14
1.3.2 The Measurement Problem
Our second problem—the measurement problem of quantum theory—has a com-
paratively short history: arising with the development of quantum mechanics
in the latter 1920s, this puzzle rapidly became the fledgling theory’s central
conceptual quandary. The measurement problem concerns the evident incom-
patibility of the dynamics of a quantum-mechanical system in two situations:
when the system evolves undisturbed and when the system is measured. The
former dynamics obey the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation, completely fol-
lowing the theory’s mathematical formalism. The latter dynamics appear to
involve an instantaneous reduction of the wavefunction, crucially violating the
theory’s explicit predictions. Although these two forms of dynamics can be rec-
onciled sufficiently to perform experimental tests and to exploit novel features
of quantum theory, there remains the incompatibility of the two modes of evolu-
tion. The question of what actually happens when we measure remains baffling,
elusive, open.
The measurement problem has provoked the proposal of an ever-increasing
number of potential solutions. These solutions typically fall into one of two
categories: novel interpretations of quantum theory intended to dissolve its
difficulties, or subtle modifications of quantum theory intended to harmonize
its two forms of dynamics. Each explanation has its ardent advocates, but most
physicists still view the measurement problem as unresolved. Some physicists—
Smolin included—advance the position that the measurement problem has no
solution as posed. This perspective’s motivations will prove of interest in ensuing
sections.
1.4 Space and Time in the Quantum Universe in a Nut-
shell
Smolin addresses the problem of constructing a physical theory of a closed sys-
tem from the perspective of contemporary physics. He begins by locating this
task’s conceptual and technical difficulties in the presence of ideal elements in
our current physical theories. These constructs are formal elements of a the-
ory’s mathematical structure the interpretation of which requires the existence
11[18], 2.
12[18], 2. See [20] for a comprehensive discussion.
13See [8]. For philosophical commentary see [14, 36, 18].
14See the first appendix for a brief discussion of classical Barbour-Bertotti theory.
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of objects external to the system described by the theory. Smolin illustrates
his definition with examples from classical mechanics—inertial frames and ab-
solute time—and from general relativity—cosmological symmetry assumptions.
He then extensively discusses ideal elements in quantum mechanics. With this
central concept firmly established, Smolin argues for the elimination of ideal
elements from physical theory as the key to quantum cosmology. Drawing on
Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, he demonstrates why ideal elements ne-
cessitate externals for their interpretation and why ideal elements have no place
in quantum cosmology.
This critical introductory work complete, Smolin turns to the constructive
task at hand: building a theory of the universe on the pillars of general rel-
ativity and quantum mechanics. Supposing first that the canonical approach
to quantum gravity holds promise, he drafts three criteria for an acceptable
measurement theory of quantum cosmology. In particular, he maintains the
necessity of finding an intrinsic time variable—a function on the theory’s phase
space that mimics the role of a time coordinate—for this approach’s success. As
an instructive example Smolin treats the quantization of prerelativistic Barbour-
Bertotti theory. Unable to locate an intrinsic time, however, he cannot interpret
this simplified quantum cosmology along the lines of his sketched measurement
theory. Acknowledging the failure of all attempts to apply the intrinsic time
program, Smolin proffers the substantial modification of quantum theory as the
next alternative. To this end he presents a series of ten proposals for a specu-
lative quantum cosmology devoid of ideal elements. To illustrate several of his
ideas—especially his dynamical principle of maximal variety—Smolin considers
graph-theoretic models as rudimentary solutions to his conjectured theory.
Smolin covers a lot of territory—from the absolute–relative debate through
the interpretation of quantum theory to Dirac’s large number hypothesis and the
cosmological constant problem—in his engaging article; despite this breadth the
paper is solidly unified by its primary aim—treating the problem of constructing
a physical theory of a closed system through Leibnizian philosophy. Moreover,
in bringing together these seemingly disparate foundational puzzles of modern
physics, Smolin fosters a sense of unity in the natural world viewed through a
Leibnizian lens.
My enthusiasm for Smolin’s work aside, I believe that, while there is much to
commend, there is also much to critique. In evaluating his article I do not touch
on every topic that he discusses; instead, I concentrate on Leibnizian themes
in quantum cosmology. I turn to Smolin’s discussion of ideal elements in §2.
First I examine his definition of ideal elements (§2.1) and consider his motiva-
tion to frame the problem of quantum cosmology with this construct (§2.2). As
Smolin defines ideal elements, they differ little from theoretical structures that
the relationalist would deem substantival; nevertheless, the definition allows him
to make an insightful connection between the absolute–relative debate and the
measurement problem. Then I analyze his two principal arguments from the
principle of sufficient reason: for the necessity of extrinsic objects in the physical
interpretation of ideal elements (§2.3) and for the elimination of ideal elements
from physical theory (§2.4) These conclusions rely heavily on the principle of
sufficient reason’s deductive power; they also raise questions regarding the feasi-
bility of Smolin’s program. In §3 I address Smolin’s two approaches to quantum
cosmology: the first substantially maintaining quantum theory (§3.1), the sec-
ond significantly modifying quantum theory (§3.2). The former approach, in
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addition to suffering from a lack of technical support, falls prey to Smolin’s own
argument against the inclusion of ideal elements. The latter approach, in addi-
tion to suffering from a lack of technical development, requires the rethinking of
several of its key components.15 Finally, in §4 I scrutinize the links and debts
of Smolin’s project to Leibniz’s philosophy and Barbour’s thought, commenting
specifically on the former’s use of the principle of sufficient reason (§4.1), maxi-
mal variety proposal (§4.2), and connections to relationalism (§4.3). I conclude
that, except for a few notable insights, Smolin’s work is largely derivative; fur-
thermore, I argue that he is unjustified in his primary deviation from Leibniz’s
and Barbour’s thought, namely, the retention of time as a fundamental notion.
2 On Ideal Elements
2.1 Definition
Smolin defines the ideal elements of a physical theory as
absolute or background structures that are contingent, in the sense
that they may be altered without altering the basic character of the
theory, play a role in the dynamical equations of the theory, and are
not themselves determined by solving any dynamical equations.16
He expounds further upon the first and third conditions.
By contingent I mean that [the element] reflects an arbitrary choice,
and that a different choice could have been made without altering
the basic mathematical structure of the theory. By nondynamical I
mean that the choice that is made is not arrived at by solving any
dynamical equations, and cannot be influenced by the state of the
dynamical degrees of freedom.17
Smolin illustrates his definition with examples of ideal elements in classical
mechanics, general relativity, and quantum mechanics. Instead of analyzing
how strictly these examples conform to the general definition—leaving evalua-
tion of specific instances of ideal elements to necessary moments in my ensuing
discussion—I scrutinize the concept of ideal element.
Smolin’s definition is reasonably clear—he certainly conveys an intuitive
sense for the concept—and his examples strengthen our grasp. Several avenues
of inquiry and clarification nevertheless present themselves. First I more closely
examine his three conditions in an attempt to refine his meaning. Next I reflect
on his choice of the term ‘ideal element’. Finally I compare Smolin’s ideal
elements to Leibniz’s relational quantities and Barbour’s uniform background
structures.
To further elucidate the above definition, we must determine the intended
connotations of four key words: absolute, background, contingent, and dynam-
ical. Undoubtedly, Smolin employs ‘absolute’ in the sense of Newton’s absolute
15Admittedly, Smolin acknowledges the speculative and schematic nature of his second
proposal.
16[41], 231.
17[41], 239.
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space and absolute time:18 fixed, unchanging, independent. He uses ‘back-
ground’ almost synonymously to ‘absolute’, to denote theoretical elements that
merely set the stage or provide a backdrop. ‘Contingent’ does not here pos-
sess its usual philosophical meaning in opposition to necessary truth; rather,
‘contingent’ is virtually synonymous with ‘arbitrary’, yet fitting the prescribed
circumstances of its role in the theory. Finally, Smolin employs ‘dynamical’ in
its generalized modern sense to refer to that which evolves according to the
framing equations of a physical theory.
Given this analysis of the definition’s language, why does Smolin choose
the terminology ‘ideal element’? The usage of ‘element’ is transparent: each
ideal element is a structural component of the theory’s mathematical edifice.19
In what sense are these elements ideal? The usual meaning of ‘ideal’ suggests
that in some appropriate fashion ideal elements are idealizations—perfected
replacements for imperfect structures. I contend that this is Smolin’s intended
connotation since his prescription for the elimination of ideal elements involves
their replacement with intrinsic yet approximate dynamical analogues.
These clarifications are helpful, but I would like to broach a more interesting
and significant issue for my purpose of exploring Leibnizian themes. Why does
Smolin feel the need to introduce the new terminology of ideal elements? My
answer continues into the next three subsections, cropping up occasionally in the
essay’s remainder as well. Here I respond by comparing Smolin’s ideal elements
to two related concepts—Leibniz’s relational quantities and Barbour’s uniform
background structures.
When debating the nature of motion, we require standards of judgment for
determining if a given dynamical theory favors substantivalism or relationalism.
These standards depend on sundry factors including the theory’s context within
the larger realm of physics, the theory’s domain of applicability, and the view-
points of those selecting the criteria. A particular method for establishing such
standards of judgment involves the prior identification of certain theoretical
quantities as being relational. We then deem relational any dynamical theory
that only invokes these identified quantities and substantival any dynamical
theory that also invokes additional quantities. Since the relationalist position
stems from Leibniz, I propose to call these elements Leibnizian relational quan-
tities. The archetypal example theory is of course Newtonian mechanics. In this
context the Leibnizian relational quantities are the Euclidean distances between
pairs of point particles.20
Now, what is the relationship between Smolin’s ideal elements and Leib-
nizian relational quantities? First of all, Smolin’s use of the adjectives ‘absolute’
and ‘background’ to describe ideal elements suggests an immediate connection.
Those elements that do not qualify as relational we label substantival or ab-
solute.21 Smolin requires additional characteristics of his ideal elements. Do
Leibnizian relational quantities mirror these features? For concreteness I sug-
gest that we first consider the example of the Euclidean distance between point
18He cites these two constructs as the archetypal ideal elements.
19Note that Smolin does not remark upon the identifiability or the independence of ideal
elements. In practice the identification, separation, and subsequent elimination of an ideal
element might prove more difficult than the definition suggests.
20The masses of point particles also enter the theory; although not relational, we are justified
in assuming these data because the theory makes no attempt to explain the origin of mass.
21Note that we seek a disanalogy between ideal elements and relational quantities.
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particles in classical mechanics. How does this relational quantity compare?
This distance is not contingent but certainly dynamical; however, the Euclidean
metric, by which this distance is measured, meets the criteria of an ideal element.
We still consider these Euclidean distances to be relational quantities because,
in the context of classical dynamics, the assumption of Euclidean geometrical
relations is clearly justified. Generalizing from this example, I conclude that
ideal elements appear to constitute substantival structures, the counterparts
to Leibnizian relational quantities, except that they incorporate no notion of
contextuality. As we shall see, this absence of context underlies a potential
difficulty for Smolin’s proposal for the elimination of ideal elements. I return
to the relationship between Smolin’s program based on ideal elements and the
relationalist program in §4.3.
Barbour gives as “the minimal ontological principles of the relation[al]ist
standpoint” the following statement: “the existence of things is established
through perceived variety and abstract uniformity is nothing.”22 He thereby
introduces the notion of a uniform background structure, a standard against
which we supposedly express and measure the change of perceived variety.23 In
the case of dynamical theories, space and time (or spacetime) constitute the
two primary uniform background structures. Since Smolin identifies space and
time as the two archetypal ideal elements, we are naturally led to inquire into
the relation of ideal elements to uniform background structures. Clearly, the
latter are contingent and nondynamical: the type of uniformity with which we
endow our structure is tunable, and once so tuned our structure serves as a fixed
reference. Uniform background structures thus qualify as ideal elements,24 but
do all ideal elements qualify as uniform background structures? Of all the ex-
amples that Smolin cites, only two do not immediately strike me as uniform
background structures: the inner product on the quantum-mechanical state
space and the correspondence of quantum-mechanical operators with classical
observables. With a bit of thought, we quickly realize that the inner product is a
uniform background structure. It provides a standard by which to measure the
norm of any state space element. The aforementioned correspondence, however,
does not straightforwardly conform to the definition of a uniform background
structure. This analysis suggests that the ideal element is a more general con-
cept. We must not yet dismiss uniform background structures, though; they
reenter the discussion in the next subsection and in §4.3.
2.2 Framing the Problem of Quantum Cosmology
Smolin frames the problem of constructing a physical theory of a closed system
using my two popular physics problems for philosophers, the absolute–relative
debate and the measurement problem. He contends that the problem of quan-
tum cosmology is “the basic issue behind [not only] the criticisms of Newtonian
mechanics by Leibniz, Berkeley, and Mach, [but also] the problem of the in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics.”25 He asserts that “quantum cosmology
remains a complete enigma precisely because we have not learned how to re-
22[1], 254.
23[1], 252.
24I have not forgotten the second criteria: as I stated just above, we use uniform background
structures to coordinate variety.
25[41], 230.
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solve these two [issues]; [t]hat is, we do not know how to construct a theory
that could be interpreted as a theory of an entire universe.”26 Furthermore, the
development of a quantum theory of gravity—a pursuit intimately intertwined
with that of quantum cosmology—stands at the nexus between these two long-
standing problems; presumably, quantum gravity will require the simultaneous
resolution of both issues.
Having rooted two of the most foundational questions of contemporary
physics in the problem of quantum cosmology, Smolin offers a diagnosis and
solution through his concept of ideal elements. He contends that both the
absolute–relative debate and the measurement problem arise from the presence
of ideal elements in the respective theories that these issues plague. By elim-
inating ideal elements from dynamical theory, Smolin hopes to neutralize our
difficulties in formulating a theory of the entire universe. When we have over-
come our reliance on ideal elements, we will finally be in a position to resolve
the absolute–relative debate and the measurement problem through quantum
cosmology. Smolin clearly envisions this resolution vindicating relationalism:
a theory devoid of ideal elements could not be substantival. Smolin does not
possess so clear a vision for the measurement problem, a fact which underscores
the different characters of these two foundational puzzles.
Smolin’s linking of the absolute–relative debate with the measurement prob-
lem represents a novel insight into the foundations of physics. His move leads
us to inquire just how closely related these two issues are. As I presented the
absolute–relative debate in §1.3, the key question was ‘Does spacetime exist
independently of material entities, or do spatiotemporal relations reduce to the
relations amongst material entities?’. Smolin’s characterization of the debate
is similar except that, in emphasizing the difficulties for developing a universal
theory involved in answering ‘no’ and ‘yes’ to my two questions, he links his
portrayal to the broader concept of ideal element. Barbour contends that “the
question at the heart of the criticism of Newtonian dynamics made by Leibniz,
Berkeley, and Mach concerns precisely the use of any uniform standard in dy-
namical theory.”27 This characterization is clearly more general than mine since
it does not limit itself to the uniform standards of space and time. As we have
seen, this characterization is also closely related to Smolin’s. Though Barbour
identifies the use of uniform standards as the debate’s crucial issue, he certainly
realizes the relevance of treating the universe in its entirety.
Superficially at least, the measurement problem possesses quite a different
character from that of the absolute–relative debate. Depending on how one con-
ceives of the problem, it is an issue of either quantum theory’s interpretation,
quantum theory’s incompleteness, or, a` la Smolin, quantum theory’s inapplica-
bility to the entire universe. Interestingly, each of these aspects finds a resonance
in the absolute–relative debate. First, the determination of a dynamical the-
ory’s status—substantival or relational—is not unequivocal: it depends on the
interpretation of these two positions with respect to that theory. Second, a dy-
namical theory might well appear substantival or relational because it does not
fully capture the intricacies of the world. A deeper understanding would reveal
the world’s relational or substantival character, respectively. Third, by failing to
account for interactions with distant sectors of the universe, a dynamical theory
26[41], 231.
27[1], 252.
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can appear substantival when it is in fact relational. Barbour-Bertotti theory
demonstrates how a universally relational theory gives a substantival impression
locally.28
The relation of the absolute–relative debate to the measurement problem
thus depends on the lens through which we examine these two issues. Is one
of these aspects most significant? Smolin clearly believes that the last is of
critical concern for our pursuit of more fundamental physical theories. Before
concluding this subsection, I would like to indicate one further such perspective.
Consider the following three facts. Quantum theory imports unadulterated the
kinematic structure of absolute space and time; the measurement problem is of-
ten claimed to arise from our need to reference a classical realm; all of the ideal
elements of quantum mechanics that Smolin discusses ultimately refer to clas-
sical concepts. I now inquire: to what extent might the measurement problem
stem directly from the reliance of quantum mechanics on classical concepts?29
I do not pursue these thoughts further, but I believe them of sufficient interest
to be mooted.
2.3 Argument for Externality
The frame for quantum cosmology that Smolin erects stands upon two founda-
tional conclusions about the status of ideal elements in physical theory. First,
he draws an important implication from the presence of ideal elements: the in-
terpretation of an ideal element requires the existence of an object external to
the system treated by the theory. Second, he employs this entailment to moti-
vate the key step to constructing a quantum cosmology: the elimination of ideal
elements from physical theory by replacement with dynamical analogues. To
substantiate these claims, Smolin presents arguments for each based upon the
principle of sufficient reason. I consider the first claim now; I treat his argument
for elimination in the next subsection.
Smolin’s argument for the necessity of externals in the interpretation of ideal
elements proceeds as follows. He states three premises.
First Premise The ideal element is present because it is necessary
to explain something in the internal or local dynamics of the system
under study.30
Second Premise The theory that incorporates that ideal element may
be assumed to be complete in the sense that once the ideal element
has been specified, the internal dynamics is completely determined
and produces predictions that agree with experiment.31
Third Premise If Leibniz’s argument impells us to replace that ideal
element with a dynamical entity, that entity cannot be one of the
dynamical degrees of freedom of the intrinsic system because that
dynamics has already been completely specified.32
28See the first appendix.
29We might even wonder if the measurement problem results from the absolute–relative
debate.
30[41], 246.
31[41], 246.
32[41], 246.
12
He draws this conclusion.
Conclusion Hence, it must be something that is outside of the system
under study.33
The first premise merely restates the function that an ideal elements performs
in a dynamical theory. The second premise is a sound assumption: the ideal
element has indeed been constructed to complete the theory in this predictive
sense.34 The third premise is a conditional statement that will prove true if the
condition—“Leibniz’s argument impells us to replace that ideal element with
a dynamical entity”—is justified. To what does “Leibniz’s argument” refer?
Smolin here invokes Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, which demands that
there be a sufficient reason for any circumstance to exist or any event to oc-
cur in a certain manner.35 Since an ideal element is contingent—it involves
an arbitrariness of choice—its presence conflicts with the principle of sufficient
reason. To satisfy Leibniz’s principle, we must modify our theory so that it no
longer contains ideal elements. Each ideal element, however, serves a necessary
role in the theory’s dynamics and interpretation; therefore, we cannot remove
the ideal element without rendering the theory impotent and its interpretation
incoherent. Aside from inventing a wholly new theory, our only option is to
construct within the theory a dynamical analogue for the ideal element. This is
essentially Smolin’s argument for the elimination of ideal elements as we shall
see in the next subsection. The dependence on the principle of sufficient reason
is thus laid bare. Provided that we accept this consequence of Leibniz’s central
tenet, Smolin’s argument succeeds. Moreover, the argument demonstrates the
potential difficulty for quantum cosmology that ideal elements pose. The elim-
ination of ideal elements becomes a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of
the quest for quantum cosmology.36
2.4 Argument for Elimination
Smolin identifies the elimination of ideal elements from physical theory as both
key and hurdle to constructing a quantum cosmology. As I discussed in the
previous two subsections, he attempts to motivate this point of view by two
means: insights into the resolution of foundational problems in physics and
argument for the necessity of external objects in interpreting ideal elements.
Motivations, especially when compelling, often provide sufficient reason, but
deductions oblige. Smolin thus presents a general argument for the elimination
of ideal elements.
His deduction from the principle of sufficient reason—which he construes as
the statement “In a complete theory of the universe, every question of the form
33[41], 246.
34As Smolin remarks, if the theory “were not complete in this sense, [then] we would not
be very interested in its further development” ([41], 246).
35Leibniz writes: “Our reasonings are based on two great principles, that of contradiction
. . . And that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no true or
existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not
otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us” ([28], 217).
36We might wonder whether or not this argument is tautological; for, Smolin has crafted
his definition of ideal elements so that their elimination from physical theory is a necessary
condition for quantum cosmology. Since his definition does not make ideal element elimination
a sufficient condition as well, Smolin’s proposal is nontrivial.
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Why is the world this way rather than that way? must have an answer.”37—
proceeds as follows. He proffers two premises.
First Premise There should be no arbitrary choices made in the
construction of a complete physical theory.38
Second Premise Any time such a choice must be made, one is putting
in by hand something that one would like explained by a deeper,
more fundamental theory.39
He draws this conclusion.
Conclusion Thus, the principle of sufficient reason can be taken to
mean that, in a complete physical theory, there should be no ideal
elements.40
The first premise is a rephrasing of Smolin’s version of the principle of sufficient
reason. The second premise seems a reasonable assessment of an arbitrary
factor’s introduction into a physical theory.41 Does the conclusion now follow?
Indeed, as Smolin has construed the principle of sufficient reason and defined
ideal elements, the former entails the elimination of the latter.
Which component of the argument—the principle of sufficient reason or the
definition of ideal element—performs the brunt of the work? The argument ap-
pears to thoroughly meld these two components, but to what extent has Smolin
engineered the definition of ideal elements to make them susceptible to elimina-
tion via the principle of sufficient reason? The notion of an ideal element already
stems from Leibnizian considerations, which the principle of sufficient reason,
as a central tenet of his philosophy, imbues. I am therefore inclined to identify
the principle of sufficient reason as the primum mobile of Smolin’s argument.
Indeed, the principle of sufficient reason can wield considerable deductive power
because of its generality of formulation and of application.
Shortly following the above argument, Smolin discusses the principle of suf-
ficient reason’s role as a completion criterion for physical theories. He writes
Any question we may ask in a given theory that fails the test of
sufficient reason thus represents an opportunity for a future the-
ory. As long as we do not have this future theory, we must concede
that whenever such a question is left open, a theory might arise
that resolves this question and yet agrees with the testable parts of
our present theory . . . as long as the possibility of this happening
is open, we cannot claim with confidence that the present theory is
complete.42
Initially this argument seems plausible, but upon reflection it raises serious
philosophical difficulties. First, Smolin’s reasoning suggests that there exists a
purely theoretical test for a physical theory’s applicability to the entire universe:
does the theory employ ideal elements? Presumably, Smolin does not envision
37[41], 244.
38[41], 245.
39[41], 245.
40[41], 245.
41As I discuss shortly, however, this statement is not unproblematic.
42[41], 245.
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such a test replacing experiment;43 rather, once we have discarded all of the
theories that fail this applicability test, we distinguish empirically between the
remaining candidates.
Second, that we can never have confidence in the completeness of a present
theory follows as a subsidiary conclusion. When a present theory fails the test
of sufficient reason, we can have confidence in its incompleteness. If, however,
a present theory satisfies the test of sufficient reason, then how can we have
confidence that we have asked of it all of the appropriate questions? This
concern may not be an issue in practice: do we not always treat scientific theory
as incomplete in this sense? Is not this a hallmark of scientific knowledge?
More importantly, though, does this concern pose an obstacle or impediment
for Smolin’s program based on the elimination of ideal elements? My conclusion
suggests that we can never be confident that we have eliminated all of the ideal
elements from a theory. Accordingly, that theory could not serve as a quantum
cosmology. This consequence seems an insuperable barrier to Smolin’s plan,
yet again it may not prove a problem in practice. Taking Smolin’s advice we
might attempt to develop physical theories devoid of ideal elements. This effort
might produce highly successful theories even if we do not achieve the goal of
complete ideal element elimination. The pertinent question now becomes ‘Does
the attempt to eliminate ideal elements appear a promising route to theory
building?’. I return to this inquiry in §3.2 when I consider Smolin’s maximal
variety proposal.
These latest concerns raise some broader philosophical issues regarding the
elimination of ideal elements. To what extent can human scientists develop
physical theories devoid of ideal elements? Do we rely on ideal elements in some
ineliminable way in constructing and interpreting physical theories? These two
questions are inherently difficult to answer, yet I would like to register sev-
eral remarks. As Smolin notes, we have never constructed a physical theory
completely free of ideal elements. He cites general relativity with cosmological
boundary conditions as our best effort; yet, when working with this theory, we
often introduce ideal elements—for instance, the aforementioned assumptions of
cosmological homogeneity and isotropy—to render the theory more practicable.
This difficulty to work with the unadultered theory tells against our ability to
make sense of theories without ideal elements. Of course our difficulties might
merely reflect our unfamiliarity with this type of theory: as we develop the
skills to cope without ideal elements, this objection would vanish.44 Though,
we might attempt to argue—along the lines of Niels Bohr’s philosophy towards
quantum theory—that we require the crutch of ideal elements—analogously to
the classical side of the Heisenberg cut—to interpret physical theory. Further-
more, will we always be able to replace an ideal element with a dynamical
analogue? If this proves the case, then our crutch will always be there to offer
support. If the contrary proves true, then we must rely on a novel theoretical
insight to save our theory, perhaps akin to the abandonment of the luminiferous
43Smolin’s other writings—see, for example, chapters thirteen, seventeen, and nineteen of
[43]—indicate that he firmly supports the experimental method. There is a sense, nevertheless,
in which the principle of sufficient reason, taken to its logical extreme, demands a unique
theory of the universe.
44Smolin further asserts that we do not understand general relativity with cosmological
boundary conditions “very well . . . as a dynamical system, in ways which are important for
the problem of constructing the quantum theory” ([41], 231-232).
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æther.
Smolin recognizes Barbour-Bertotti theory as a simplified case in which the
elimination of certain ideal elements is transparently achieved. Our ability to
construct this relational reduction of Newtonian mechanics demonstrates that
we can at least begin the process of ideal element elimination. Whether or not
we can carry the process to its logical conclusion is quite a different question.
I have offered several arguments for and against our ability to create theories
without ideal elements. I have one further comment. In a certain regard Smolin
attempts to answer the question ‘What can we learn of the universe as de facto
residents?’ through his program of ideal element elimination. This inquiry is
also difficult to answer, but I suggest that we sidestep it by taking seriously the
observation that we necessarily reside within the universe. This fact dictates
that our efforts to describe and comprehend the universe necessarily draw only
on resources within the universe. Does not this observation thus provide a
glimmer of hope for Smolin’s project?
3 Directions for Quantum Cosmology
Smolin considers two routes to quantum cosmology. His analysis of ideal ele-
ments in quantum mechanics has forced upon him the conclusion that we must
modify this theory to make it applicable to the universe as a whole. Both of
his proposals accordingly involve a structural modification of standard quan-
tum mechanics, the first moderate, the second drastic. The first seeks a theory
of the universe through the canonical quantization approach to quantum grav-
ity.45 On the basis of his aforementioned analysis, Smolin maintains that there
is only one viable route to making canonical quantization succeed, the so-called
intrinsic time program.46 In §3.1 I discuss and critique this route to quantum
cosmology. The second seeks a theory of the universe through the development
of a completely novel dynamics. Smolin is forced to outline this new theory pri-
marily because of the lack of significant progress on the intrinsic time program.
He uses the opportunity to reveal his vision of a truly fundamental theory of the
universe. In §3.2 I evaluate his series of ten specific proposals for this theory’s
form.
3.1 Just Beyond Quantum Theory
Of Smolin’s several conclusions concerning ideal elements in quantum mechan-
ics, the most pressing for the development of quantum cosmology is the inner
product’s reliance on an external time. The inner product forms an integral
part of the measurement theory, but an external time is clearly inadmissible.
To address this problem Smolin first drafts three criteria that an acceptable
measurement theory of quantum cosmology must satisfy.47 These conditions
lead Smolin to consider how the inner product could be constructed intrinsi-
cally. In light of the quantum mechanical nature of a dynamical time,48 Smolin
45See [26] for a comprehensive review of the canonical approach.
46See [26] for a comprehensive review of the intrinsic time program.
47I have elected to skip these specifics because they are not directly relevant to my concerns.
48I here refer to the fact that a quantum-mechanical clock necessarily has limited accuracy.
For a discussion of these issues, see [31] and [44].
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sees only one option: the intrinsic time program.49
Besides the dearth of technical progress on the intrinsic time program, there
are several arguments against its feasibility in the physics literature.50 Instead
of examining these arguments, I offer a criticism of the intrinsic time proposal
inspired by Smolin’s own concept of ideal element. The following question cap-
tures my concern. Supposing that an intrinsic time variable is identified, to
what extent is this variable an ideal element? To judge we must evaluate the
intrinsic time variable’s status as regards the definition of ideal elements. First
of all, an intrinsic time variable does not technically count as an absolute or
background structure—this fact constitutes the bulk of Smolin’s motivation for
maintaining any faith in the program—because it is one of the dynamical vari-
ables on the theory’s phase space. Nevertheless, an intrinsic time acts very
much as an absolute or background structure: it performs precisely the same
role as does the usual time parameter of standard quantum mechanics, as the
formal equivalence of the two defining equations shows. There is thus an explicit
sense in which an intrinsic time variable is eligible for comparison to the three
criteria of ideal elements. I treat each in turn. First, is an intrinsic time variable
contingent? This question’s answer depends on the number of variables on the
theory’s phase space that could function as an intrinsic time. If the variable
is unique, then it is certainly not contingent. If we have a choice among two
or more candidate variables, then we might deem the intrinsic time contingent.
Note, however, that the required form of the constraint equation upon canonical
transformation cannot be altered; in this sense there exists little choice in the
form of the intrinsic time variable. Second, does an intrinsic time variable play
a role in the theory’s dynamical equations? The answer is of course a resound-
ing yes; in fact, we have selected the variable for its special dynamical role.
Third, is an intrinsic time variable nondynamical? Again, the intrinsic time is,
by definition, a dynamical variable. It serves its singular role by remarkable
dynamical interaction with the other dynamical variables. This role, however,
is so exceptional that the intrinsic time variable appears to be nondynamical in
fulfilling it. My analysis suggests that the presence of an intrinsic time would
be too good to be true: so faithfully would it mimic its external counterpart
that we might well mistake the one for the other.
Before exploring Smolin’s second route to quantum cosmology, I would
like to touch briefly upon one further issue. In his discussion of the intrinsic
time approach to quantum gravity, Smolin assumes that a measurement the-
ory is a necessary supplement to the theory.51 Of course we intend to perform
experiments—we must test our candidate quantum cosmologies—so of course
we require a measurement theory. My point, however, concerns the relation
of our theory of quantum cosmology to its associated measurement theory. A
quantum cosmology is a theory of the universe, and measurements are natural
phenomena within the universe; therefore, a theory of quantum cosmology must
include its measurement theory, and we possess no reason to differentiate the
two. These remarks relate to the concept of Einstein-Feigl completeness, the re-
49See the second appendix for a brief discussion of the intrinsic time program.
50See [25, 2, 44].
51As we shall see in the next subsection, Smolin neglects issues of measurement and inter-
pretation in the presentation of his second proposal. It is unclear if he has disregarded these
concerns or if he has registered the force of my ensuing comments.
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quirement that a physical theory account for its confirmation basis.52 I contend
that any attempt to create a quantum cosmology must eventually confront this
issue. The degree to which a putative quantum cosmology unifies our physical
knowledge will determine whether or not Einstein-Feigl completeness is a con-
cern. For instance, the canonical quantization approach to quantum cosmology
currently employs too primitive a characterization of matter to make Einstein-
Feigl completeness an issue. On the other hand, Smolin’s second proposal for
quantum cosmology aspires to a level of fundamentality on which Einstein-Feigl
completeness must be accomplished.
3.2 Well Beyond Quantum Theory
Given the paucity of results from the intrinsic time program, Smolin considers
“how we might invent a new physical theory that could be a quantum theory of
the universe as a whole.”53 He decides to set forth a list of ten “new principles
and new hypotheses about nature” to guide “the discovery of such a theory.”54 In
§3.2.1 I state each of Smolin’s proposals, discussing in turn their motivations and
merits as fundamental ideas for a theory of the universe based on contemporary
physics. When I have finished this analysis, I reflect on the success of his
proposals as guides to future physics and of his framework in achieving a physics
free from ideal elements in §3.2.2.
3.2.1 The Vision
Smolin clearly intends to frame a fundamental theory of the universe with his
ten proposals. We must keep this intention in mind while I present and assess
his vision.
First Proposal The randomness of quantum mechanics is a consequence of
its being necessarily a theory of only a small portion of the universe.55
This proposal establishes the sense in which the theory being sketched would
constitute a quantum cosmology: quantum mechanics emerges from a more uni-
versal theory as a description of suitably local physics. Smolin extensively illu-
minates the manner in which he envisions this emergence proceeding. He begins
by asserting that his proposal “is the only possibility . . . fully consistent with
the principle of sufficient reason.”56 This comment seems to reflect his belief
that the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is incompatible with the
principle of sufficient reason. For, we may always ask the question ‘Why did
that outcome occur?’, but quantum theory can provide no more reason than
a probability of occurrence. Supposing that quantum mechanics is susceptible
to the test of sufficient reason, we need an explanation for the theory’s proba-
bilistic nature.57 Whether or not Smolin’s explanation is the only acceptable
52See [16, 19], [21], especially pages 58 through 61, and [22], especially pages 38 through 41.
53[41], 267.
54[41], 267.
55[41], 267.
56[41], 267.
57Alexander Pruss has recently commented on this issue: he attempts to reconcile quantum
mechanics with the principle of sufficient reason. See [37], especially pages 160 through 170.
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one is a separate matter; I postpone its consideration until I have discussed the
remainder of Smolin’s commentary.
Smolin envisages a deterministic theory of the universe involving nonlocal
interactions. He therefore accommodates both the principle of sufficient reason’s
demand that measurement outcomes have causes and the experimental disproof
of the Bell inequalities’58 demand that interactions be nonlocal. On this view
the entire universe essentially consists of a network of nonlocal interactions.
When attempting to construct a theory of local physics, we would have to
appropriately average over the nonlocal degrees of freedom. Smolin suggests
“that the resulting statistical theory would be quantum mechanics.”59
Smolin’s proposal is eminently plausible. In addition to the motivations that
he cites, there is another, perhaps more obvious, reason to claim quantum me-
chanics as a theory of local physics. Experience, both casual and experimental,
indicate that quantum-mechanical phenomena only occur on sufficiently small
distance scales. Attempts to observe macroscopic superpositions may challenge
our experience in several years, but for now the quantum appears confined to
the minute.
As promised, I return to the question of the uniqueness of Smolin’s pro-
posal as regards the principle of sufficient reason. I first note that there is in
fact a well-developed deterministic and nonlocal theory from which quantum
mechanics emerges: the de Brøglie-Bohm pilot wave theory.60 There are also
other approaches—for instance, suitable developments of dynamical collapse
models61—that have the potential to reduce quantum-mechanical phenomena
to a deterministic theory. Smolin thus concludes prematurely that the principle
of sufficient reason singles out his proposal.
Second Proposal There is a deterministic theory that describes the universe
as a whole. It is completely relational and nonlocal.62
Smolin expounds.
[This theory] would be relational because any theory without ideal
elements must contain only dynamical variables that involve rela-
tional quantities.63
As I have explained, Smolin’s proposal based on ideal elements is closely related,
if not identical, to the relationalist program. Smolin explicitly states that any
dynamical analogue for an ideal element is necessarily relational. Thus, a theory
devoid of ideal elements is relational: all of its non-ideal elements are relational,
and all of its ideal elements have been replaced by relational constructs.
Smolin again invokes Bell’s theorem as a motivation for nonlocality; he also
states that “nonlocal interactions are essential for the process of replacing uni-
versal ideal elements,” citing as evidence the situation in the classical Barbour-
Bertotti models.64 Although nonlocality may well prove indispensable for this
58See pages 14 through 21 of [11].
59[41], 268. Smolin has developed these ideas for the origin of quantum mechanics in [39]
and [40].
60See [12, 13] for the original proposal. See [45] for a comprehensive account.
61See, for example, [35] or [23].
62[41], 268.
63[41], 268.
64[41], 268.
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replacement process, classical Barbour-Bertotti theory does not serve as a good
indicator. Barbour-Bertotti theory is an instantaneous action-at-a-distance the-
ory, possessing an absolute concept of simultaneity; consequently, it has little
to say on the topic of locality. While not of serious import for Smolin’s invoca-
tion of nonlocality—Bell’s theorem is much more significant—this consideration
raises a pertinent issue. Smolin makes nonlocality a basic property of his fun-
damental theory. The concepts of locality and of nonlocality employ notions of
spacetime structure in their definitions. As we shall see shortly, however, Smolin
makes space and its structure an emergent property of the universe. To invoke
nonlocality at a fundamental level, therefore, threatens a logical contradiction.
Third Proposal The causal topology of this fundamental theory reflects the
history of interactions among particles in the universe rather than the present
spatial relations.65
This proposal’s message is intuitive and appealing: in specifying the uni-
verse’s state we must take a completely holistic view. It also resonates with
Leibniz’s conception of the complete interconnection of things.66 Again, we
must, however, ask if Smolin has attempted proverbially to run before he can
walk. Three of the concepts he here employs—causality, history, and spatial
relations—do not enter his theory at a fundamental level.67 Like locality, causal-
ity involves a notion of spacetime structure; history invokes a notion of time
evolution; and spatial relations involve a notion of distance. If we grant Smolin
the benefit of the doubt—assume that by ‘causal’ he refers to the more gen-
eral notion of causation, not the specific notion of causality—then this usage
no longer presents a contradiction.68 Furthermore, as we shall see in the next
three proposals, Smolin sketches the emergence of spatial relations and relative
distance and elevates time to a basic notion, thereby licensing to a certain ex-
tent his usage of spatial relations and history.
Fourth Proposal The dynamics of the fundamental theory are such that in
the thermodynamic limit in which the number of fundamental particles goes to
infinity, spatial relations emerge as a good approximate description of the causal
relations among particles in the system.69
Smolin thus concludes that space is a completely emergent phenomenon;
moreover, since the underlying theory is relational, space necessarily inherits this
property. Smolin foresees that in this same limit classical physics—presumably
general relativity—emerges as the universal theory’s dynamics. He gives little
indication of why classical physics should become an appropriate description in
this thermodynamic limit. I surmise that he banks on the Machian idea that the
sheer multitude of particles will provide a system of reference points mimicking
spatial relations.70
65[41], 268.
66See pages 152 through 153 of [27] and §§56-62 on pages 220 through 221 of [28].
67Causation, meaning “the production of an effect,” is more general than causality, which
refers to the deterministic structuring property of spacetime ([17]).
68I must admit, however, that I interpret his usage of causal to connote the latter meaning.
69[41], 269.
70See, for instance, pages 262 through 265 of [1].
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Smolin has now elucidated how both pillars of contemporary physics—general
relativity and quantum mechanics—emerge from his hypothetical fundamental
theory. Given his explanations of their emergence, how should we place the
fundamental theory on the classical-quantum spectrum? Or is this spectrum
unsuited to Smolin’s vision?
The theory’s key attributes include determinism, relationalism, nonlocality,
holism, and, as he shall propose shortly, finitude. Neither general relativity nor
quantum mechanics incorporates all of these characteristics. Both accommodate
determinism, holism, and finitude in certain respects; while general relativity
leans more towards relationalism, quantum mechanics is manifestly nonlocal.
Smolin himself believes that “general relativity is . . . a great deal closer to the
kind of theory [that] we need in order to do cosmology.”71 As he admits, though,
“not all of the obstacles come from the quantum-mechanical side.”72 Perhaps
we must concede that consideration of this spectrum is uninformative.
Fifth Proposal The relative distance between two particles is a measure of
their closeness in terms of the topology of the network of relations of the funda-
mental theory.73
This proposal draws insightfully on Leibniz’s principle of the complete no-
tion of a contingent thing. By defining distance through the differences, or,
equivalently, the similarities, in relations among fundamental particles—with
near particles possessing similar views and far particles possessing dissimilar
views of the network of relations—Smolin achieves an elegant, relational, and
emergent notion of distance. As he subsequently demonstrates, this conception
of distance is readily implemented in his graph-theoretic models.
Sixth Proposal The fundamental nonlocal dynamical theory has a descrip-
tion in terms of an evolution of its state in a relational time.74
Smolin gives three reasons for “choosing to keep time as a fundamental
concept.”75 The first two reasons, by way of physical motivation, are intimately
connected. Smolin believes that, in retaining a notion of time, he will more
easily recover familiar physics and more clearly understand this recovery. (Of
course he sidesteps having to recover time from his fundamental theory.) Smolin
also believes that, in retaining a notion of time, he will keep a concept of which
our current physical theories provide a firm grasp. Smolin’s last reason is of a
subjective character: he holds “that the most fundamental observation we make
about the world is that events are structured in terms of a flow of time.”76 Smolin
is welcome to maintain these beliefs, but we should examine how well they hold
up to scrutiny.
First I must elucidate what Smolin means by ‘relational time.’ Although
he makes no other reference to this concept in the paper, the term is defined
71[41], 231.
72[41], 231.
73[41], 269.
74[41], 270.
75[41], 270.
76[41], 270.
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elsewhere.77 There Barbour and Smolin employ ‘relational time’ to designate
the notion of time that arises in classical Barbour-Bertotti theory.78 I discuss
this concept in the first appendix.
I now begin my assessment of Smolin’s three reasons for retaining time.
His first motivation—that a notion of time will ease the recovery of familiar
physics—is speculative: he may or may not be correct, but only time will tell.
His second motivation—that a notion of time represents a well-understood as-
pect of familiar physics—is controversial. We certainly possess an intuitive
understanding of time, which we bring not only to the development of physical
theory, but also to the employment of physical clocks. In Newtonian mechanics,
quantum theory, and perhaps even general relativity, however, we do not un-
derstand the time parameter or label in any emergent or reductive sense. What
is the status of our understanding of relational time in Barbour-Bertotti the-
ory? In certain respects we understand this time in the aforementioned sense:
the time metric is determined by the best matching procedure,79 which only
involves relational spatial data. In other respects we do not understand the re-
lational time. First of all, we introduce an arbitrary time label into the theory
to parametrize paths in the relative configuration space. This introduction is
clearly necessary and warranted; however, this introduction dictates that the
theory include a fundamental variable possessing a time-like80 topology. Fur-
thermore, since the time metric derives from spatial relations, we need a proper
understanding of spatial relations to truly comprehend the emergent relational
time. In classical Barbour-Bertotti theory these spatial relations are justifiably
assumed to be Euclidean; thus, we do not grasp them in any emergent or re-
ductive sense. Given these last two points, I maintain that we must disagree
with Smolin’s second claim and that we must achieve an understanding of space
prior to developing an understanding of time.
I would like to rebut Smolin’s third motivation for retaining a fundamen-
tal notion of time with two lessons: the first from operational considerations,
the second from modern physics. As I stated above, Smolin believes that our
observations of the flow of time stand as our most basic worldly experience.
This contention is of course debatable. For instance, Barbour maintains that
instantaneous configurations represent our most basic worldly experience, and
he capitalizes on this viewpoint to develop a novel interpretation for quantum
gravity.81 These beliefs aside, should not Smolin as a physicist consider how
time is measured in practice? As many authors before me have noted,82 when-
ever we measure time, we actually observe the relative change of two systems:
a standard phenomenon (‘clock’) and an interesting phenomenon (‘process’).
An abstract time enters nowhere except in the theory that we might employ
to describe the clock and the process. Should not Smolin as a physicist also
consider the reflection of human experience in contemporary physics? How far
is the special relativistic notion of time from that of human experience? The
general relativistic notion is surely even more incongruent, yet it underlies our
77See page 7 of [9].
78Barbour previously referred to this concept as Leibnizian time in [2].
79See the first appendix for an explanation.
80I do not use ‘time-like’ in its relativistic sense; rather, the adjective ‘time-like’ refers to
the continuity and monotonicity of the time label.
81See [5], especially pages 2884 through 2885, and [6], especially pages 264 through 267.
82For a striking exposition see part 2 of the second chapter’s §VI in [33], especially pages
272 through 273.
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most celebrated physical theory of space and time. Smolin aspires to develop
an even more fundamental theory applying to regimes far removed from that
of the humble environment in which the human race evolved its perception of
time. Can he really expect typical human experience to guide the way?
Seventh Proposal The universe consists of a finite number of particles or
fundamental entities.83
This proposal is at once the clearest and the vaguest: the distinction be-
tween finite and infinite is perfectly transparent, but what constitute Smolin’s
“particles or fundamental entities”? The obvious initial response is the particle
content of the standard model or an appropriate generalization of it. This reply,
however, is poorly substantiated. I would expect Smolin to indicate this reply
if he intended it. He clearly does not, however, since he does not even commit
to the existence of particles.
What then do we take as the theory’s fundamental entities? Smolin recog-
nizes (in an endnote) the necessity of a response but offers none.84 Evidently,
Smolin thinks that this concern is not sufficiently pressing. I maintain that he
is terribly mistaken. First of all, recall the motivation for retaining aspects of
both general relativity and quantum mechanics in a quantum theory of gravity
that I briefly discussed in §1.2. The first theory excels in its description of space
and time while the second theory excels in its description of matter and energy.
Since Smolin seeks a unification of these two theories—moreover, a unification
in which space emerges from the interactions the universe’s constituents—he
cannot avoid the question at this paragraph’s start.
Smolin is also concerned with the origin of gravitation.85 General relativity
teaches us that gravitation is intimately intertwined with space, time, and mat-
ter; specifically, general relativity has us conceive of gravitation as arising from
the geometry of spacetime induced by the presence of matter. Now, in Smolin’s
universal theory, space emerges from the relations of interacting fundamental
entities. If gravitation is written into emergent space as general relativity would
dictate, then we must understand the nature of his theory’s fundamental en-
tities. How else can we elucidate gravity’s origin? In my overall appraisal of
Smolin’s vision, I return to this issue in light of the conjectured theory’s funda-
mental nature.
Eighth Proposal Quantum physics emerges as a description of the fluctua-
tions around the thermodynamic limit in which classical mechanics on a spatial
background emerges from the fundamental theory.86
This is Smolin’s second comment on how quantum mechanics fits into his
scheme. At first glance this eighth proposal differs markedly from the first: the
first makes explicit reference to the role of relative scale in the emergence of
quantum mechanics while the eighth explains the manner in which this emer-
83[41], 270.
84“Many people, from Einstein to present-day advocates of string theory, have felt that this
was not sufficient; a theory that purports to be a theory of the whole universe, they argue,
should also have something to say about what is in that universe” ([41], 281).
85As we shall see, before presenting his final two proposals, he raises this question.
86[41], 271.
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gence proceeds. Are the two proposals in fact compatible? We should first
understand precisely what Smolin now proposes.
As he previously suggests, in the thermodynamic limit classical spatial rela-
tions emerge as an accurate description of the theory’s dynamics. By classical we
took him to mean general relativistic. Now, in certain regimes and on sufficiently
small length scales, a general relativistic spacetime is well approximated by a
special relativistic spacetime, which in turn is well approximated by Newtonian
absolute space and time provided that relative velocities remain significantly
below the speed of light. We thus grasp how classical mechanics emerges in the
thermodynamic limit of Smolin’s speculative theory. Smolin also proposes that
the thermodynamic limit is approximate because the universe consists of a finite
number of fundamental entities. His eighth proposal is now more comprehen-
sible: quantum mechanics describes the fluctuations about the thermodynamic
limit in regions of sufficiently small scale to be described by classical mechan-
ics in an exact thermodynamic limit. Standard quantum mechanics employs a
Newtonian spacetime background. Accordingly, for the theory to be applicable,
approximately or exactly, the actual spatial background, emergent or absolute,
must be Newtonian spacetime. Since Minkowski spacetime provides a more
accurate description, relativistic quantum field theory emerges as a better char-
acterization of these fluctuations. Thus, we do require the thermodynamic limit
for quantum mechanics to be a good description.
Is this proposal equivalent to the first? Recall that the first proposal at-
tributed quantum-mechanical phenomena to the statistical averaging over non-
local degrees of freedom to obtain a local physics. In principle this procedure
has no need for a thermodynamic limit, approximate or exact, but I have shown
how an approximately Newtonian background, necessary for the applicability
of quantum mechanics, requires a thermodynamic limit on Smolin’s scheme.
Furthermore, the first proposal’s process of statistical averaging invokes no pre-
existing fluctuations; it creates fluctuations by ignoring information in nonlocal
degrees of freedom. We have thus uncovered a serious tension between Smolin’s
two explanations of the emergence of quantum-mechanical phenomena.
In which proposal should we lay more stock? I contend that the first proposal
is better motivated. As I previously discussed, it provides a compelling expla-
nation for why quantum mechanics applies so strikingly to microscopic scales.
Alone the first principle cannot explain the emergence of Newtonian spacetime
that quantum mechanics requires, but, augmented with the fourth proposal, we
can account for this circumstance. In conjunction with the seventh proposal, the
fourth proposal must not, however, entail the eighth proposal. The fluctuations
to which Smolin alludes in this latter proposal are fluctuations of the emergent
spacetime relations around Newtonian spacetime relations. Such fluctuations
do not give rise to quantum-mechanical behavior; though, they do affect the
applicability of that theory. I therefore submit that we ignore Smolin’s eighth
proposal.
Smolin interrupts his presentation to identify three “glaring problems” left un-
solved by his proposals thus far.87
First Problem How can the dynamics of the fundamental relational
theory be chosen so that a low-dimensional space emerges as an
87[41], 271.
24
appropriate description of the network of relations in the thermody-
namic limit?88
Second Problem We must explain how the principle of inertia and
the relativity of inertial frames emerges from a theory in which all
distances to begin with are both relational and absolute.89
Third Problem We would like to know where in this scheme gravity
comes from, and why it is weaker by many orders of magnitude than
the other forces.90
Smolin comments briefly on these issues. Starting with the second, he notes
that we have a clear indication for how to solve this problem because Barbour-
Bertotti theory accomplishes this aim for classical mechanics.91 On the other
hand, he claims that the first problem will prove most difficult. Indeed, Smolin
maintains that the recovery of 3-dimensional space is the key to unlocking his
proposed theory’s development. With his graph-theoretic models he makes a
preliminary attempt to address the emergence of low-dimensional space. Al-
though I do not discuss this part of his article, I note that his attempt is
intriguing and promising. Finally, Smolin admits that he currently has “no
good answer” to his third problem.92 Considering my criticism of his seventh
proposal, this admission comes as no surprise.
Smolin now moves on to the presentation of his graph-theoretic models, in
the midst of which he states the last two proposals.
Ninth Proposal In a discrete theory of relations, the variety is the funda-
mental dynamical quantity. The fundamental dynamical principle is that the
universe evolves in such a way as to maximize its variety.93
Smolin’s ninth proposal deserves special attention for two reasons: first, it
invokes the Leibnizian emphasis on variety as a salient feature of the natural
world, and, second, it presents the guiding dynamical principle of this con-
jectured universal theory. After discussing the intended notion of variety, its
motivations, and its place within Leibniz’s philosophy, I critique Smolin’s prin-
ciple of maximal variety both as a suggestion for the creation of structure and
in relation to the arrow of time.
Smolin uses variety in its colloquial sense: the quality of being diverse, the
absence of uniformity.94 Why does he elevate so ordinary a concept to the status
of fundamental dynamical quantity? Barbour compellingly makes the case for
variety.
Science in general and dynamics in particular is only made possi-
ble by the fact that we perceive variety. This perceived variety is
88[41], 271.
89[41], 271.
90[41], 271.
91Beware of Smolin’s perplexing juxtaposition “relational and absolute”. I take ‘relational’
to indicate that the theory involves only relational notions of distance; I take ‘absolute’ to
indicate that at the fundamental level the theory does not involve the notion of relative, or
perspectival, frames of reference.
92[41], 271.
93[41], 277.
94[46]
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the starting point of all science. There is however a pronounced
tendency in science to degrade variety and operate as far as possi-
ble in terms of homogeneous and uniform substances . . . A key task
in science is therefore to identify and quantify the salient variety
in the phenomena under investigation . . . the aim of dynamics is,
at its most general, to characterize change of variety quantitatively
. . . Ultimately, the reason why perfect uniformity cannot serve as
the practical basis of a quantitative science is that perfect unifor-
mity is nothing . . . variety must provide its own terms of reference
for describing the way in which it is changing.95
Barbour also illuminates how variety forms an integral component of Leibniz’s
philosophy. He remarks first that “variety is the starting point of Leibniz’s
ontology,”96 expounding
that the whole tendency of Leibniz’s philosophy is to present science,
not as the explanation of perceived variety in terms of something
which is as uniform as possible, but rather as the recognition of
order and unity within diversity.97
Furthermore, “following Leibniz’s epistemology, existence is identified as the
possession of attributes that distinguish—the possession of positive variety.”98
The “interconnection of accommodation of all created things to each other, and
each to all others, . . . is the way of obtaining as much variety as possible, but
with the greatest order possible.”99
This emphasis of Leibniz’s philosophy underlies the relationalist program.
All these different [forms of dynamics hitherto developed] are based
essentially on the idea that the change of variety is to be expressed
by means of certain uniform standards . . . the question at the heart
of the criticism of Newtonian dynamics by Leibniz, Berkeley, and
Mach concerns precisely the use of any uniform standard in dynam-
ical theory . . . [the epistemological criticism of Newtonian dynamics]
centres on the discrepancy between theory, in which change of vari-
ety is referred to a uniform standard, and actual practice, in which
change and variety are in fact referred, not to space and time, which
remain invisible, but to other variety . . .We have thus the minimal
ontological principles of the relation[al]ist standpoint: the existence
of things is established through perceived variety and abstract uni-
formity is nothing.100
We have grasped how variety could plausibly form the basis for a reconcep-
tion of physics and how Leibniz envisioned its maximization accounting for the
universe’s structure. I must now ask an all-important question. Does Smolin’s
dynamical principle dictating variety maximization possess the organizing power
to generate the structure that we observe in the universe? We cannot expect
95[1], 251-253.
96[1], 251.
97[1], 251-252.
98[4], 125.
99[28], 220.
100[1], 252-254.
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a detailed answer to this broad inquiry primarily because investigations into
Smolin’s proposal are still far too limited. Despite the limited development,
however, I believe that the few attempts to build interesting structure from the
principle of maximal variety show promise and potential. Smolin already takes
the first steps towards solving his first glaring problem. Barbour begins to de-
velop further Smolin’s ideas, preliminarily sketching how quantum-mechanical
phenomena could arise.101 Barbour and Smolin construct model systems in
which three interesting forms of structure derive from the extremization of va-
riety: “the dynamics is deterministic globally, but stochastic on the smallest
scales”; “[a]t an intermediate scale structures emerge which are stable under
stochastic perturbations of smaller scales”; and “in the near to extremal config-
urations . . . both short ranged repulsive forces and long ranged attractive forces”
emerge.102 All three of these instances of structure building from maximal va-
riety do not in fact employ the specific form of Smolin’s proposed dynamical
principle: they do not work on the evolution towards maximization of variety.
This fact does not degrade the significance of variety and its extremization as a
guiding idea; it merely suggests that the specific form of Smolin’s initial proposal
might not prove the best instantiation of the maximal variety doctrine.
To further this last thought, I consider the relation of Smolin’s specific pro-
posal to the third most popular physics problem for philosophers: the arrow
of time. Smolin proposes that the universe evolves towards states of increasing
variety. This conception is strikingly reminiscent of our current scientific be-
lief in the universe’s evolution towards states of increasing entropy. How might
variety and entropy be related? With only an intuitive sense for the quantifi-
cation of variety, we might have difficulty connecting it to (one of) the specific
definitions of entropy, but perhaps our intuition will prove sufficient for now.
Variety is nearly synonymous with diversity. Although entropy is often asso-
ciated or equated with disorder—or, more accurately, identified as a measure
of disorder—I suggest that the statistical definition of entropy will prove more
useful. In this sense entropy is effectively a measure of the probability of a given
state within an ensemble of states. The universe’s evolution towards states of
greater entropy thus becomes evolution towards more probable states. This
interpretation has the important consequence that the universe originated in
a highly improbable state. For variety to relate to entropy, states of greater
variety must be more probable. A priori I see no reason why this must hold
true. When we look to our physical knowledge of the universe’s evolution, what
light do we shed on this possibility? Current cosmological theory predicts that
the universe will continue to expand forever, its mutual gravitational attraction
insufficient to balance or overcome its outward acceleration. The universe will
thus become increasingly dilute, and its myriad clusters of matter will become
increasingly concentrated.103 If vast expanses of virtually empty space punc-
tuated by isolated concentrations of matter correspond to high variety, then
perhaps the connection between entropy and variety is strong. This fact would
have three remarkable consequences: first, Smolin’s proposal would solve the
problem of the arrow of time;104 second, it would indicate an intimate connec-
101See [3], especially pages 1067 through 1072.
102[10], 1.
103The statistical mechanics of self-gravitating systems is counterintuitive: clumpiness as
opposed to uniformity is the mark of high entropy. See [24] for a discussion of these predictions.
104Barbour has a similar proposal for the arrow of time’s origin. See chapter twenty-two of
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tion between variety and gravitation; and, third, variety and its maximization
would find a link to a well-developed branch of physical theory—statistical me-
chanics. Of course this is probably too much to hope for, but only specific
implementations of Smolin’s dynamical principle will tell.
Tenth Proposal The principle of maximal variety drives the tuning of the
physical constants so that systems of arbitrary complexity can evolve and main-
tain themselves in the universe. In some future physics it will account for both
the existence of gravitation and the existence of life.105
Smolin’s last proposal is a mixture of bold, creative ideas and poor, mis-
placed ideas. The former come in the first clause as an inventive explanation
for the physical constants’ values; the latter fill the proposal’s remainder. As
I mentioned in §1.2, physicists currently view as pressing the problem of the
determination of the values of our universe’s physical constants. In particular,
a widespread sentiment maintains that these values are statistically improbable
or, in physics jargon, fine-tuned. Although Smolin does not detail its func-
tioning, he suggests a robust mechanism for the dynamical determination of
these values.106 The proposal’s second clause—“so that systems of arbitrary
complexity can evolve and maintain themselves in the universe”—completely
lacks import: complex systems have developed and endured, so the dynamical
principle of a theory describing our universe must account for such phenomena.
The last sentence is equally unenlightening in its second prediction as life cer-
tainly falls into the category of evolved and maintained systems of remarkable
complexity.
In light of previous discussion, the last sentence’s first prediction deserves
our attention. Again, any candidate fundamental theory must explain the phe-
nomenon that we call gravitation. As we currently understand this phenomenon,
gravitation is a manifestation of the form of spacetime arising from the distri-
bution of matter and energy. Since the notions of space, time, matter, and
energy are conflated with the notion of gravitation, we appear to require an
understanding of the former four for an understanding of the latter one. As
my analysis of the previous nine proposals has shown, Smolin only provides a
reasonable approach to the first of these four concepts. In particular, without a
description of the objects—fundamental particles, entities, events, or what have
you—on which our measure of variety is based, the principle of maximal variety
cannot act. Smolin still seems very far from solving his third glaring problem.
3.2.2 The Appraisal
Now that we have examined the entirety of Smolin’s second approach to quan-
tum cosmology, I would like to comment on the program as a whole. Recall
that before stating his first hypothesis, Smolin warned us of the speculative and
schematic nature of what followed. I must agree with this assessment: Smolin
sketches several compelling conjectures that deserve further attention and in-
vestigation, but his warning does not serve to excuse those speculations that
[6].
105[41], 279.
106In [42] Smolin develops an alternative mechanism for the tuning of physical constants that
applies natural selection to the cosmos.
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fail to hold up to scrutiny. I first identify his proposal’s three aspects that strike
me as most significant and insightful. I then identify the two aspects that strike
me as most requiring rethinking and improvement. To this end I suggest how
each of the latter two aspects might find resolution in Smolin’s program.
His conjectured theory has three principal highlights: the hypotheses that
quantum mechanics arises as a statistical theory of local physics, that causal
topology and relative distance emerge from the complete interconnection of the
universe, and that the maximization of variety performs a fundamental dynam-
ical role in structuring the cosmos. Interestingly, all three of these ideas derive
from Leibnizian philosophy. As Smolin himself informs us, the first hypothe-
sis is the only explanation of quantum-mechanical phenomena compatible with
the principle of sufficient reason. The second hypothesis draws heavily on the
Monadology ’s vision of the universe’s organization. Though in a modern guise,
the third hypothesis realizes Leibniz’s idea that the world contains “as much
variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible.”107
His conjectured theory also has two principal pitfalls: it lacks any indication
of what constitute the universe’s fundamental entities, and the retention of time
as a basic notion seems unjustified. Excepting these two pitfalls, Smolin’s theory
appears a promising attempt to push forward our understanding of the universe.
To prevent these two obstacles from impinging upon further development, can
we readily resolve or dissolve them? In the case of the second fault, a solution
suggests itself: simply deny time a fundamental status. This suggestion may not
seem like much of a solution since now we must additionally recover time from
a more basic description. As I have indicated, though, we appear to require a
thorough understanding of space prior to establishing a proper understanding
of time. Since Smolin already calls for the emergence of space, perhaps an
emergent time will come along for the ride. Granted, the recovery of time might
not prove a cakewalk, but, as Smolin contends, the derivation of space will be
much more difficult. The denial of time also leads to the elimination of the last
apparent ideal element in Smolin’s theory, namely, time itself.
His theory’s second fault seems like an entirely different predicament. As I
indicated in my criticism of Smolin’s seventh proposal, the nature of the uni-
verse’s fundamental entities is essentially tied to the foundations of everything.
There might, however, be one Leibnizian loophole—a wholly monadic approach.
This is perhaps the position at which Smolin hinted, but he does not come close
to explicitly endorsing it. According to the Monadology, the world consists en-
tirely of monads, fundamental entities par excellence—“true atoms of nature”—
which possess the capacity to bear certain attributes.108 These attributes are
mirrored in the universe by the network of relations between the monads in such
a way that each “monad is, in fact, simply the world as seen from its particular
point of view.”109 This idea resolves an apparent tension in Leibniz’s philosophy.
Monads are at first glance absolute and independent. If we take relationalism
to its logical conclusion, however, then the existence of such entities seems a
contradiction. Conceiving of monads as consisting essentially of their relations
107[28], 220.
108[28], 213-214.
109[4], 130. Leibniz writes: “This interconnection or accommodation of all created things to
each other, and each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations
that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual, living
mirror of the universe” ([28], 220).
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to one another relieves the tension.
This line of thought inspires my solution to Smolin’s problem of fundamen-
tal entities. I suggest that we do not hypothesize any attributes, excepting
existence, for our fundamental constituents; rather, we only consider possible
relations between them. Here the example of a mathematical graph is apposite:
its vertices do not have any basic characteristics; they merely have relations to
other vertices as expressed by their connectivity. We must of course still de-
termine what relations to allow amongst the fundamental entities. Smolin and
Barbour have begun from the first natural relation: connected or not connected.
Whether or not this elementary relation will suffice remains to be determined,
but, perhaps, on this view the most important question will become what rela-
tion works.
4 A Lot of Leibniz, A Bit of Barbour
I have now inspected the totality of Smolin’s quest for quantum cosmology from
the elimination of ideal elements. To conclude I analyze the extent to which
Smolin draws on Leibniz’s and Barbour’s thought in developing and implement-
ing his proposal. I hope to touch upon the following questions. To what extent
has Smolin just rebranded Leibniz’s philosophy in a modern guise? How in-
debted to Barbour’s interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy is Smolin? Where is
Barbour’s work on relationalism most evident? What aspects represent novel
Smolin?
Smolin open his article with an extensive epigram: a series of five quotations
filling nearly two pages. The first two excerpts come from Leibniz’s On the
Principle of Indiscernibles and Monadology. They reference the principle of
sufficient reason (“. . . this important principle, that nothing happens without
sufficient reason . . . ”), the relational nature of space and time (“. . . space to
be something purely relative, like time . . . ”), and the complete interconnection
of existence (“. . . there are no purely extrinsic denominations because of the
interconnection of things . . . ”).110 Smolin’s links to Leibniz are explicit from
the outset.
Smolin opens his acknowledgments with a profuse thanks: a note to Bar-
bour’s impact on his viewpoint. He credits Barbour with “awakening [his] Leib-
nizian tendencies” and cites “the extent to which [Barbour’s] views have influ-
enced those expressed” in this paper.111 Smolin’s debts to Barbour are explicit
by the end.
Of course we all attribute aspects of our outlooks and opinions to the influ-
ences of specific people who have notably affected our thinking. I certainly do
not intend to write off Smolin’s work as purely derivative; quite the contrary, I
myself find many of his ideas equally as compelling as he finds those of Leibniz
and Barbour. (Unsurprisingly, I too am attracted to Leibnizian and Barbourian
thought.) Nevertheless, I believe that we will further our analysis and under-
standing of Smolin’s program through close examination of his bonds to Leibniz
and Barbour.
110[41], 228.
111[41], 280.
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4.1 Deploying the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Smolin prefaces his two arguments from the principle of sufficient reason with
the following proviso.
While I do not expect to convince an audience of physicists with
a priori arguments, let me not leave this topic without indicating
what sort of arguments I have in mind.112
He then deploys the principle of sufficient reason in its full glory. As I have
demonstrated, the arguments for externality and for elimination rely heavily
on Leibniz’s principle for their deductive success. I have difficulty envisaging
the arguments proceeding by different routes—especially routes acceptable to
a physicist—and this very observation is surely the motivation for his above
proviso. We might wonder why he bothers with the arguments at all given his
audience; I suspect that, even if the arguments are judged indecisive by his
audience, they still play a motivating role.
I would instead like to ponder the following question. Why does Smolin
invoke only the principle of sufficient reason? True, this principle is the second
of Leibniz’s central tenets from which his entire philosophy follows. Yes, Smolin
takes Leibniz’s argument against absolute space and time based on the princi-
ple of sufficient reason as the “prototype” for his argument for ideal element
elimination.113 But, the principles of contradiction and of sufficient reason are
not Leibniz’s only well-known tenets. Leibniz also defended the principles of the
identity of indiscernibles and of the complete notion of a contingent thing.114
Given his audience of physicists, why does Smolin not appeal to either of these
principles? Both the identity of indiscernibles and the complete notion of a con-
tingent thing are quasi-logical statements; they are also grounded in observation
and experience to a certain extent. Accordingly, a physicist would find them
eminently more appealing and convincing principles than that of sufficient rea-
son with its theological overtones. Moreover, in physics we are concerned with
explanations, not with reasons.
Barbour cites the identity of indiscernibles and the complete notion of a
contingent thing as relationalism’s two primary epistemological principles, ex-
tensively demonstrating how they inform and clarify the Leibnizian position.
Given his relational leanings, why does Smolin not incline to these two prin-
ciples? They could help to motivate not only the elimination of certain ideal
elements, but also several of the ideas that Smolin presents in his conjectured
fundamental theory. Would not framing these aspects of his program with the
identity of indiscernibles and the complete notion of a contingent thing illumi-
nate two further overarching Leibnizian structures?
Of course there is an economy in drawing on just one principle, but not if
that principle carries excessive metaphysical baggage. Now, the identity of in-
discernibles and the complete notion of a contingent thing do not push through
Smolin’s two key arguments, but they could assist in the presentation and com-
prehension of his approach to quantum cosmology. Since Smolin evidently ex-
112[41], 244.
113[41], 244. See page 325 of [29] for Leibniz’s argument.
114The former states that any two objects possessing exactly equivalent properties are in fact
the same object; the latter states that, in order to identify completely a single object, we must
specify that object’s every attribute to such an extent that we can then deduce everything
that could logically follow about that object.
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pects a priori reasoning to provide only motivation, I do not understand why
he neglects these two Leibnizian tenets.
4.2 Maximizing Variety
The very notion of variety is intimately connected with the identity of indis-
cernibles and the complete notion of a contingent thing. The former principle
serves as a detector of uniformity, an enforcer of variety. The latter principle
serves as a means to characterize and relate variety. Despite Smolin’s neglect of
these connections, he makes great strides with the concept of variety.
Leibniz hatched the conception of a maximally varied universe exhibiting
remarkable order nonetheless. On his picture, ignoring for the moment the ex-
tramundane, variety brings the world into existence: all monads—“the elements
of things”—are “different from each other.”115 Barbour persuasively argued for
grounding physics in variety. With Bertotti he demonstrated the power of this
idea by exposing its structuring role in classical dynamics. Although Barbour
pointed to the quantification of variety as “a key task of science,” Smolin made
the great leap forward.116 In deploying the maximization of variety as a mathe-
matical principle for guiding the universe’s dynamics and creating the universe’s
structure, Smolin gives Leibniz’s vague scheme a precise formulation, turning
Barbour’s suggestion on its head by making salient not just the quantification
of variety, but the very quantity of variety.
4.3 Relation to Relationalism
Throughout my essay I have considered the relationship between Smolin’s pro-
gram based on ideal elements and the relationalist program inspired by Leibniz.
I would now like to draw a final conclusion regarding the nature of this relation-
ship. Effectively, this consideration boils down to the questions of how much
Smolin has extracted from Leibniz and Barbour and how much Smolin has cre-
ated for himself. Allow me first to briefly review the status of this relationship
as elucidated so far.
In §2.1 I compared Smolin’s ideal elements to two related concepts: Leib-
nizian relational quantities and uniform background structures. I found that
Leibnizian relational quantities are essentially the opposites of ideal elements,
except that they incorporate a notion of contextuality. I also found that uniform
background structures only diverge from ideal elements in possessing a slightly
diminished scope. In §2.2 I compared Smolin’s conception to Barbour’s concep-
tion of the absolute–relative debate’s roots. Although their respective emphases
differ, I showed how they nevertheless share the same concerns. Thus, it seems
that Smolin’s ideal elements represent a broader class of constructs than the
relationalist would typically deem substantival. What if we take the relational-
ist position to its logical extreme, abandoning any limit of contextuality? Still,
Smolin’s concept seems the more encompassing. Recall the previous exam-
ple of the correspondence between quantum-mechanical operators and classical
observables. Smolin identified the correspondence itself as an ideal element.
Relationalism seems ill-equipped to brand such constructs substantival even if
there are substantival structures lurking in the background. Of course with this
115[28], 213-214.
116[1], 252.
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augmented generality comes imprecision. As with my several objections to the
feasibility of Smolin’s program, only the results of theory building will measure
the degree to which this imprecision matters.
Smolin’s true insight is thus revealed in the generality of his ideal elements
over and above the relationalist position. This generality allows him to link
the absolute–relative debate and the measurement problem through quantum
cosmology. This generality allows him to build a promising program for the
development of quantum cosmology. In a definite respect Smolin’s insight of
generalization consists in the updating of Leibniz’s ideas to a world that has
witnessed the quantum. We must not let this insight blind us to his debts to
Leibniz’s thought. First of all, the definition of ideal elements borrows sub-
stantially from Leibniz’s critique of Newtonian absolute space and time, and
in many instances the critique from ideal elements coincides with that from
relational quantities. The definition of ideal elements also banks heavily on
Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason not only in its crafting, but also in its
application. What are we ultimately to conclude of Smolin’s program? We
have observed Leibniz’s influence in many aspects of Smolin’s paper. I believe
that Smolin is largely indebted to Leibniz for his motivations and his vision and
that, although Smolin’s work in modernizing Leibnizian thought is significant,
part of the credit is due to Barbour.
A Barbour-Bertotti in Brief
Classical Barbour-Bertotti theory provides a relational reduction of Newtonian
mechanics: it derives the latter theory from mathematical principles involving
only the relative distances between pairs of particles in static configurations.
The theory begins from the relative configuration space, the abstract math-
ematical space of all possible relative configurations of N point particles in
3-dimensional Euclidean space. (We employ the adjective ‘relative’ to indicate
that the set of all possible configurations has been quotiented by the group of
translations and rotations of Euclidean space. In other words, the only data
required to parametrize a given relative configuration are the N(N−1)2 relative
distances between all pairs of particles.) To any two relative configurations
we can assign a numerical value that measures the intrinsic difference between
these two configurations. This value takes as input only the relative distances
between pairs of particles in each configuration; it also depends on how we have
envisioned one configuration aligning with the other configuration.117 Now, via
a mathematical extremization procedure called best matching, we can minimize
the intrinsic difference by varying over all possible such alignments. Once we
have calculated the minimal intrinsic differences between all pairs of configura-
tions, we can create sequences of configurations from any subset of the configu-
ration space. We simply order the subset of configurations such that neighboring
configurations have the minimum intrinsic difference between them. We can also
parametrize any sequence of configurations in the relative configuration space
by a continuous, monotonically-increasing parameter.
With this procedure in place, Barbour-Bertotti theory is ready to work its
117To visualize this dependence, consider overlaying the first configuration on the second con-
figuration. I recommend thinking about 1-dimensional configurations for ease of visualization.
Clearly, there are an infinite number of ways to realize this overlaying.
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magic. The final ingredient is Jacobi’s principle: a mathematical procedure
for selecting orbits—sequences of configurations—in the relative configuration
space. Jacobi’s principle was first developed to solve for orbits in Newtonian
mechanics. In this setting the procedure requires as input expressions for the
potential and kinetic energies of the N particles. To import Jacobi’s principle
into the setting of Barbour-Bertotti theory, we must replace these Newtonian
expressions with their appropriate counterparts. The potential energy poses no
problem since it is a function of only the relative distances between pairs of par-
ticles. The kinetic energy, however, typically invokes a notion of time evolution.
Since time does not enter as a fundamental notion in Barbour-Bertotti theory,
we appear to have a dilemma. Best matching comes to the rescue: by providing
us with a measure of the intrinsic difference between configurations, it allows
us to define a kinetic energy without recourse to time. Now, when we solve
Jacobi’s principle in Barbour-Bertotti theory, the orbits we obtain as solutions
exactly coincide with those of Newtonian mechanics for a universe with zero
total energy and zero total angular momentum. Furthermore, while Jacobi’s
principle dictates only the orbit and not the rate at which the orbit is traversed,
Barbour-Bertotti theory allows us to derive this rate—and, consequently, the
time—all from the relative distances alone. Without presupposing an absolute
space or an absolute time, we have recovered Newtonian mechanics.
A key factor in Barbour-Bertotti theory is the consideration of the entire
universe. This holistic approach has several important consequences. First of
all, the theory yields constraints on the values of certain universal quantities,
namely, the total energy and total angular momentum. A subsystem of the uni-
verse can potentially possess any value for its energy and angular momentum,
but of course the remainder of the universe must counterbalance these values.
This fact explains why Newtonian mechanics is fantastically accurate when ap-
plied on Earth and in the solar system; it also demonstrates that a universally
relational theory can appear substantival locally. In addition to these results,
Barbour-Bertotti theory dictates why time runs commensurably from system to
system and how inertial reference frames emerge.
B Introduction to Intrinsic Time
In standard quantum mechanics the theory’s defining equation,
HˆΨ = ıh¯
∂Ψ
∂t
,
gives the time evolution of the wavefunction Ψ. This is the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion. Hˆ is the Hamiltonian operator, essentially the total energy of the system
described by Ψ; ı is the imaginary unit; and h¯ is the Planck’s constant. In
most cases the Hamiltonian breaks into two terms, the kinetic energy and the
potential energy, respectively:
Hˆ(pˆii, ξˆi) =
1
2
N∑
i=0
pˆi2i + V (ξˆi).
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The pˆii and ξˆi are the canonical momenta and position operators, respectively.
The Schro¨dinger equation then reads[
1
2
N∑
i=0
pˆi2i + V (ξˆi)
]
Ψ = ıh¯
∂Ψ
∂t
.
In the position representation of quantum mechanics, we replace pˆii with −ıh¯ ∂∂ξˆi .
In this representation the Schro¨dinger equation becomes[
− h¯
2
2
N∑
i=0
∂2
∂ξˆ2i
+ V (ξˆi)
]
Ψ = ıh¯
∂Ψ
∂t
.
In the canonical approach to quantum gravity, the theory’s defining equa-
tions are constraints on the universal wavefunction. This circumstance “is re-
lated to the fact that there is no possibility of studying the evolution of the
system in terms of an external time.”118 The primary, or Hamiltonian, con-
straint of canonical quantum gravity is
HˆΨ = 0, (1)
the so-called Wheeler-DeWitt equation. In all representations of this constraint
produced thus far, the Hamiltonian is always quadratic in the theory’s canonical
momenta: the momenta enter in a sum of squares as just above.
The intrinsic time program suggests that there exists a canonical transfor-
mation T of the momentum and position coordinates,
ηˆi = T (pˆii, ξˆi) and ζˆi = T ∗(pˆii, ξˆi),
ηˆi and ζˆi being the respective new momentum and position coordinates, such
that the Hamiltonian is cast into the following form:
Hˆ(ηˆi, ζˆi) = ηˆ0 +
1
2
N∑
i=1
ηˆ2i + V (ζˆi).
The Hamiltonian constraint then reads[
ηˆ0 +
1
2
N∑
i=1
ηˆ2i + V (ζˆi)
]
Ψ = 0.
In the position representation this becomes[
−ıh¯ ∂
∂ζˆ0
− h¯
2
2
N∑
i=1
∂2
∂ζˆ2i
+ V (ζˆi)
]
Ψ = 0.
Rearranging we obtain[
− h¯
2
2
N∑
i=1
∂2
∂ζˆ2i
+ V (ζˆi)
]
Ψ = ıh¯
∂Ψ
∂ζˆ0
.
This last equation is formally identical to the Schro¨dinger equation of standard
quantum mechanics. According to the intrinsic time proposal, we should treat
it as such, interpreting the outstanding position coordinate ζˆ0 as an intrinsic
time variable.
118[41], 252.
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